

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

IN RE: PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY
AVERAGE WHOLESALE PRICE
LITIGATION

MDL NO. 1456

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
ALL ACTIONS

CIVIL ACTION: 01-CV-12257-PBS
Judge Patti B. Saris

CLASS PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO SCHERING'S TWOMBLY SUBMISSION

Schering submits *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1974 (U.S. 2007) as supplemental authority. *Twombly* is not applicable.

Twombly is a case involving the pleading standard in an antitrust case where courts often examine economic plausibility at the outset. It has no application at this stage of this case.

Moreover, the notion that economic feasibility was not examined in this case is misplaced. For example, plaintiffs introduced at trial the textbook of Dr. Kolassa. In it Schering's own expert expounded on why generic manufacturers would publish fictitious AWPs and would be motivated to promote the spread. Plaintiffs also introduced dozen of pricing alerts signed by Mr. Weintraub informing Schering/Warrick customers of new spreads between AWP and the real price, and these spreads grew during the Class Period. Plaintiffs introduced documents in which Schering acknowledged that "spread differences" were important in getting the business of customers. And Schering spreads increased dramatically during the Class Period. Schering offered no explanation for this conduct – it was content to rely on graphics of green frogs, attacking a theory that had long passed out of the case. All of this is evidence of economic plausibility.

If that is not sufficient, former CMS Administrator Thomas Scully recently testified that in his experience, generics did without doubt game the system:

Q. Let's talk about this – this generic with multiple participants in a J Code. In that situation, what you say here about manufacturers being able to use profit margins to get people to buy their drugs doesn't work for generics, does it?

THE WITNESS: I believe it does.

BY MR. DALY:

Q. How would that be?

A. Well, I don't recall all the details, but I remember that ipratropium bromide and *Albuterol* were a couple of pennies a dose in reality in the market, and people were charging 25 times that, including the multiple generic manufacturers. *And that the markup on those respiratory drugs were one of the bigger issues we had. Probably the biggest issue as a pure multiplier factor. So it could, in fact, work on generics.* (Emphasis added.)

Ex. A at 110:18 – 111:13 (attached hereto).

Mr. Scully picked upon this theme again in his testimony:

Q. Can you think of a drug during this time period where you have a sole source branded drug where it was discounted in such a way as to increase utilization?

A. I wouldn't say discounted, but the primary ones that I would – *the thing that drove this, ipratropium bromide/albuterol were one on the generic side.* The other two were probably Remicade on the rheumatoid arthritis side, which I believe was sole source, was high volume for rheumatology. And the other two were Procrit, and then once Aranesp came on the market, they competed with each other theoretically, but they really competed over the spread, which is the thing that got my attention, I spent probably the most time on, because the highest volume, highest cost drugs, which was you could roughly – and I may be wrong on the numbers – buy a two week dose of Procrit. And similar, even though it's a one dose shot for Aranesp for 600 dollars every two weeks, and the markup –

they were competing in their markups between 1200 and 1700 to drive utilization for physicians.

And you could watch the utilization change depending on how much they marked up their AWP. And I – that was probably the thing that got me most stoked up about changing this policy, *because they were adjusting their AWPs by generate more market volume by creating incentives for physicians, which was as clear as the sun come up in the morning.*

Id. at 114:4 – 115:10 (emphasis added).

Thus, evidence at trial demonstrated that Schering published phony AWPs and marketed the spread, as does the evidence that continues to come in.

DATED: June 19, 2007

By /s/ Steve W. Berman

Thomas M. Sobol (BBO#471770)

Edward Notargiacomo (BBO#567636)

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP

One Main Street, 4th Floor

Cambridge, MA 02142

Telephone: (617) 482-3700

Facsimile: (617) 482-3003

LIAISON COUNSEL

Steve W. Berman

Sean R. Matt

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP

1301 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2900

Seattle, WA 98101

Telephone: (206) 623-7292

Facsimile: (206) 623-0594

Elizabeth A. Fegan

Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP

820 North Boulevard, Suite B

Oak Park, IL 60302

Telephone: (708) 776-5600

Facsimile: (708) 776-5601

Eugene A. Spector
Jeffrey Kodroff
Spector, Roseman & Kodroff, P.C.
1818 Market Street, Suite 2500
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Telephone: (215) 496-0300
Facsimile: (215) 496-6611

Kenneth A. Wexler
Jennifer Fountain Connolly
Wexler Toriseva Wallace LLP
One North LaSalle Street, Suite 2000
Chicago, IL 60602
Telephone: (312) 346-2222
Facsimile: (312) 346-0022

Marc H. Edelson
Edelson & Associates LLC
45 West Court Street
Doylestown, PA 18901
Telephone: (215) 230-8043
Facsimile: (215) 230-8735

**CO-LEAD COUNSEL FOR
PLAINTIFFS**

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY LEXISNEXIS FILE & SERVE

Docket No. MDL 1456

I, Steve W. Berman, hereby certify that I am one of plaintiffs' attorneys and that, on June 19, 2007, I caused copies of **CLASS PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO SCHERING'S TWOMBLY SUBMISSION** to be served on all counsel of record by causing same to be posted electronically via Lexis-Nexis File & Serve.

/s/ Steve W. Berman
Steve W. Berman

Exhibit A

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

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IN RE: PHARMACEUTICAL : MDL NO. 1456

INDUSTRY AVERAGE WHOLESALE : CIVIL ACTION

PRICE LITIGATION : 01-CV-12257-PBS

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO :

U.S. ex rel. Ven-a-Care of : Judge Patti B. Saris

the Florida Keys, Inc. :

v. :

Abbott Laboratories, Inc., : Chief Magistrate

No. 06-CV-11337-PBS : Judge Marianne B.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x Bowler

| | |
|--|---|
| <p>1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF
2 MONTGOMERY COUNTY, ALABAMA
3 -----x
4 STATE OF ALABAMA, :
5 Plaintiff, :
6 vs. : Case No.: CV-05-219
7 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., : Judge Charles Price
8 et al. :
9 Defendants. :
10 -----x
11
12 STATE OF WISCONSIN CIRCUIT COURT DANE COUNTY
13 -----x
14 STATE OF WISCONSIN, : CASE NO.
15 Plaintiff, : 04-CV-1709
16 v. :
17 AMGEN INC., et al., :
18 Defendants. :
19 -----x
20
21
22</p> | <p>1 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
2 FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
3 -----x
4 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, and : STATE OF
5 HENRY D. McMaster, in his official : SOUTH CAROLINA
6 capacity as Attorney General for : COUNTY OF
7 the State of South Carolina, : RICHLAND
8 Plaintiff, :
9 v. : CIVIL ACTION NO.
10 WARRICK PHARMACEUTICALS : 2006-CP-40-4390
11 CORPORATION, et al. : 2006-CP-40-4399
12 Defendants. :
13 -----x
14 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, and : STATE OF
15 HENRY D. McMaster, in his official : SOUTH CAROLINA
16 capacity as Attorney General for : COUNTY OF
17 the State of South Carolina, : RICHLAND
18 Plaintiff, :
19 v. : CASE NO.
20 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC. : 2006-CP-40-4394
21 Defendant. :
22 -----x</p> |
| <p>Page 2</p> | <p>Page 4</p> |

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|---|--|
| <p>1 IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
 2 FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
 3 -----X
 4 STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, and : STATE OF
 5 HENRY D. McMaster, in his official : SOUTH CAROLINA
 6 capacity as Attorney General for : COUNTY OF
 7 the State of South Carolina, : RICHLAND
 8 Plaintiff, :
 9 v. : CIVIL ACTION NO.
 10 BARR PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. : 2007-CP-40-0280
 11 Defendant. : 2007-CP-40-0286
 12 -----X
 13
 14 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
 15 STATE OF HAWAII
 16 -----X
 17 STATE OF HAWAII, : CASE NO.
 18 Plaintiff, : 06-1-0720-04 EEH
 19 v. :
 20 ABBOTT LABORATORIES, INC., et al. : JUDGE EDEN
 21 Defendants. : ELIZABETH HIFO
 22 -----X</p> | <p>1 IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS
 2 STATE OF MISSOURI
 3 -----X
 4 STATE OF MISSOURI, ex rel, :
 5 JEREMIAH W. (JAY) NIXON, :
 6 Attorney General, :
 7 and :
 8 MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL :
 9 SERVICES, DIVISION OF MEDICAL : Case No.
 10 SERVICES, : 054-1216
 11 Plaintiffs, : Division No. 31
 12 vs. :
 13 DEY INC., DEY, L.P., MERCK KGaA, :
 14 EMD, INC., WARRICK :
 15 PHARMACEUTICALS CORPORATION, :
 16 SCHERING-PLOUGH CORPORATION, and :
 17 SCHERING CORPORATION, :
 18 Defendants. :
 19 -----X
 20
 21
 22</p> |
| Page 6 | Page 8 |

| | |
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| <p>1 Videotaped Deposition of THOMAS A.
 2 SCULLY, a witness herein, called for examination by
 3 counsel for Abbott Laboratories in the above-entitled
 4 matter, pursuant to subpoena, the witness being duly
 5 sworn by SUSAN L. CIMINELLI, a Notary Public in and
 6 for the District of Columbia, taken at the offices of
 7 Jones Day, 51 Louisiana Avenue, Northwest,
 8 Washington, D.C., at 8:49 a.m. on Tuesday, May 15,
 9 2007, and the proceedings being taken down by
 10 Stenotype by SUSAN L. CIMINELLI, CRR, RPR, and
 11 transcribed under her direction.</p> <p>12</p> <p>13</p> <p>14</p> <p>15</p> <p>16</p> <p>17</p> <p>18</p> <p>19</p> <p>20</p> <p>21</p> <p>22</p> | <p>1 APPEARANCES (continued):
 2
 3 On behalf of the U.S. Department of
 4 Health and Human Services:
 5 TROY A. BARSKY, ESQ.
 6 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
 7 CMS Division
 8 C2-05-23
 9 7500 Security Boulevard
 10 Baltimore, MD 21244-1850
 11 (410) 786-8873
 12 troy.barsky@hhs.gov
 13
 14 On behalf of the State of California:
 15 NICHOLAS N. PAUL, ESQ.
 16 Supervising Deputy Attorney General
 17 Civil Prosecutions Unit
 18 P.O. Box 85266
 19 110 West A Street, #1100
 20 San Diego, CA 82186
 21 (619) 688-6099
 22 nicholas.paul@doj.ca.gov</p> |
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Page 10

Page 12

| | |
|---|---|
| <p>1 APPEARANCES:
 2
 3 On behalf of the United States of America:
 4 GEJAA T. GOBENA, ESQ.
 5 JOHN K. NEAL, ESQ.
 6 ANDREW MAO, ESQ.
 7 U.S. Department of Justice
 8 Civil Division
 9 601 D Street, Northwest
 10 PHB - 9028/P.O. Box 261
 11 Washington, D.C. 20044
 12 Gejaa.Gobena@usdoj.gov
 13 (202) 307-1088
 14
 15
 16
 17
 18
 19
 20
 21
 22</p> | <p>1 APPEARANCES (continued):
 2
 3 On behalf of the State of Alabama:
 4 ROGER BATES, ESQ.
 5 Hand Arendall, L.L.C.
 6 1200 Park Place Tower
 7 2001 Park Place North
 8 Birmingham, AL 35203
 9 (205) 502-0105
 10 Rbates@handarendall.com
 11
 12 On behalf of the State of Florida:
 13 MARY S. MILLER, ESQ.
 14 Office of the Attorney General of Florida
 15 PL-01, The Capitol
 16 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050
 17 (850) 414-3600
 18 Mary_Miller@oag.state.fl.us
 19
 20
 21
 22</p> |
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Page 11

Page 13

1 the provider gets reimbursed the same amount no
 2 matter which individual manufacturer's drug is used
 3 within that J Code, correct?

4 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form. You're
 5 talking about generics, right?

6 BY MR. DALY:

7 Q. Yes.

8 A. In generics?

9 Q. Yes.

10 A. I'm sure you're correct. My focus here
 11 was much more at the time on Procrit.

12 Q. On Procrit. Which would be a branded
 13 drug, right?

14 A. Yes. There were certainly abuses in area
 15 of ipratropium bromide and Albuterol, which had the
 16 same issues with stunning markups that were
 17 theoretically generic.

18 Q. Let's talk about this -- this generic with
 19 multiple participants in a J Code. In that
 20 situation, what you say here about manufacturers
 21 being able to use profit margins to get people to buy
 22 their drugs doesn't work for generics, does it?

Page 110

1 big spread, which was the case all across the board.

2 BY MR. DALY:

3 Q. And if you have a single source branded
 4 situation, there is just one drug and it's a sole
 5 source, that's not a situation -- well, strike that.
 6 If single source drug branded, did you believe as you
 7 look at this sentence, that in that situation, that
 8 prices could be manipulated to increase utilization?

9 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form.

10 THE WITNESS: Yes.

11 BY MR. DALY:

12 Q. Do you have -- when you have a single
 13 source branded drug, isn't it true that the sales
 14 price, the actual acquisition cost is pretty close to
 15 the manufacturer's WAC, wholesale acquisition cost,
 16 or its list price?

17 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form.

18 MR. BREEN: Objection. Form. Breen,
 19 objection, form.

20 MR. GOBENA: Gobena, objection, form.

21 THE WITNESS: I would say generally no.

22 BY MR. DALY:

Page 112

1 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form.

2 THE WITNESS: I believe it does.

3 BY MR. DALY:

4 Q. How would that be?

5 A. Well, I don't recall all the details, but
 6 I remember that ipratropium bromide and Albuterol
 7 were a couple of pennies a dose in reality in the
 8 market, and people were charging 25 times that,
 9 including the multiple generic manufacturers. And
 10 that the markup on those respiratory drugs were one
 11 of the bigger issues we had. Probably the biggest
 12 issue as a pure multiplier factor. So it could, in
 13 fact, work on generics.

14 Q. Were they -- were those drugs part of a J
 15 Code?

16 A. I assume they were. I'm not sure.

17 Q. So regardless of which drug within that J
 18 Code might have been selected by the provider, the
 19 provider would be reimbursed the same amount, right?

20 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form.

21 THE WITNESS: Yes. But the incentive to
 22 generate higher utilization was to give them a very

Page 111

1 Q. Generally no. So you feel that a branded
 2 drug without competition would discount itself?

3 A. No. I may have missed your question.

4 Q. Okay. Let's start all over with sole
 5 source. If you have a sole source branded drug?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. It's the only drug that -- you know, there
 8 is no real competition for it, there is no J Code,
 9 there is no multiple source, drugs like that
 10 typically sell pretty close to the drug's list price,
 11 right?

12 MR. GOBENA: Objection. Form.

13 MR. BREEN: Objection. Form.

14 BY MR. DALY:

15 Q. That's been your experience?

16 MR. GOBENA: Same objection.

17 THE WITNESS: I would say generally. On
 18 the other hand, if you're trying to generate volume
 19 and make it attractive to the provider to use more of
 20 it, you generally raise your AWP as high as you
 21 possibly can imagine, and the physician or the
 22 practice group makes a higher profit and they have

Page 113

1 incentive to use more, which you can read about in
2 the front page of the paper this week.

3 BY MR. DALY:

4 **Q. Can you think of a drug during this time
5 period where you have a sole source branded drug
6 where it was discounted in such a way as to increase
7 utilization?**

8 A. I wouldn't say discounted, but the primary
9 ones that I would -- the thing that drove this,
10 ipratropium bromide/albuterol were one on the generic
11 side. The other two were probably Remicade on the
12 rheumatoid arthritis side, which I believe was sole
13 source, was high volume for rheumatology. And the
14 other two were Procrit, and then once Aranesp came on
15 the market, they competed with each other
16 theoretically, but they really competed over the
17 spread, which is the thing that got my attention, I
18 spent probably the most time on, because the highest
19 volume, highest cost drugs, which was you could
20 roughly -- and I may be wrong on the numbers -- buy a
21 two week dose of Procrit. And similar, even though
22 it's a one dose shot for Aranesp for 600 dollars

Page 114

1 Procrit is a J&J drug licensed to use for oncology,
2 and Epo is an Amgen drug. It's identical, it's
3 licensed -- it's manufactured to use for dialysis.

4 **Q. And the --**

5 A. Aranesp is an extended version from
6 Procrit. I think it's once every two-week dosage,
7 but functionally equivalent, as I pointed out in
8 prior lives.

9 **Q. And this was a drug used by oncologists,
10 or those were two drugs --**

11 A. Procrit and Aranesp were used by
12 oncologists to raise red blood cell counts in cancer
13 patients. And the identical drug, Epo, is used for
14 dialysis to raise red blood cell counts for dialysis
15 patients.

16 MR. BREEN: Is that EpoGen?

17 THE WITNESS: EpoGen, Epo.

18 BY MR. DALY:

19 **Q. And what the oncologists were doing with
20 that drug was they would keep the spread that they
21 got between, say, 95 percent of AWP that they put in
22 the reimbursement for, and what they paid for it, the**

Page 116

1 every two weeks, and the markup -- they were
2 competing in their markups between 1200 and 1700 to
3 drive utilization for physicians.

4 And you could watch the utilization change
5 depending on how much they marked up their AWP. And
6 I -- that was probably the thing that got me most
7 stoked up about changing this policy, because they
8 were adjusting their AWPs by generate more market
9 volume by creating incentives for physicians, which
10 was as clear as the sun come up in the morning.

11 MR. GOBENA: Tom, you're going to have to
12 speak a little bit more slowly because the court
13 reporter is having a tough time keeping up with you.

14 BY MR. DALY:

15 **Q. Lost some people.**

16 A. It was probably the Aranesp and Procrit
17 people dropping off. But I would add, those views
18 were extremely clear in all my testimony and public
19 statements for years.

20 **Q. And Procrit is a drug that is used by what
21 kind of practice area?**

22 A. Procrit and Epo are the identical drug.

Page 115

1 **oncologists would keep the spread, correct?**

2 MR. GOBENA: Object to the form.

3 THE WITNESS: Yes. If you could buy
4 Procrit, hypothetically, for 600 dollars for a
5 two-week course of treatment, which I think is six
6 treatments, then you could -- the AWP would vary
7 because it moved, but let's say it was roughly
8 anywhere from 12 to 1700 dollars, I think, while I
9 was at CMS. And so if you were an oncologist, it's
10 an attractive spread.

11 BY MR. DALY:

12 **Q. And the spread would be -- so the
13 oncologist would keep the spread, correct?**

14 A. Yes.

15 **Q. And what the oncologists had been telling
16 you, and had been telling Congress and CMS over the
17 years was that they needed that spread to make up for
18 inadequate service fees, correct?**

19 MR. GOBENA: Object to the form.

20 THE WITNESS: That was their contention.

21 BY MR. DALY:

22 **Q. And the oncologists did, in fact, use that**

Page 117